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action directing the President to appoint a commission of inquiry without having regard 
to the separation of powers doctrine. The decision stands in contrast to an earlier decision 
(SARB v Public Protector) and a later decision (RSA v Public Protector) where the Court 
set aside the remedial action of the Public Protector that also purported to direct the 
exercise of discretionary constitutional powers. In these cases, the remedial action was set 
aside after proper regard was had to the separation of powers doctrine. This article 
therefore considers these diverging approaches where the court reviews the remedial 
action of the Public Protector directing the exercise of discretionary constitutional powers. 
It considers the effects of not consistently having regard to the separation of powers 
doctrine in reviewing the remedial action of the Public Protector. It is argued that the 
inconsistent invocation of this doctrine leads to legal uncertainty specifically in relation to 
the exercise of the President’s discretionary constitutional power as head of state to 
appoint a commission of inquiry. Furthermore, the article considers the effect the failure to 
review the Public Protector’s remedial action consistently from a separation of powers 
perspective may have on the Public Protector’s ability to adequately fulfil the mandate of 
strengthening constitutional democracy.  
Keywords: Public Protector, remedial action, separation of powers, commissions of 
inquiry. 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
In President of the Republic of South Africa v Office of the Public Protector 1 (President 
(2018)) , the President sought to set aside some components of the remedial action 
ordered by the Public Protector in terms of her State of Capture report.2 In particular, 
the President sought the review and setting aside of the remedial action that required  
him to appoint a commission of inquiry headed by an individual recommended by the 
Chief Justice. The purpose of the commission would be to uncover the full extent of 
corruption as identified in the State of Capture report. The President has the power to 
appoint a commission of inquiry in terms of section 84(2)(f) of The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution), and in President of the RSA v South African 
Rugby Football Union (SARFU III (2000)),3 the Constitutional Court stated that the 
power to appoint a commission of inquiry is a discretionary power of the President.4 In 
President (2018), the High Court refrained from setting aside the remedial action as 
requested by the President. It did so without considering whether the remedial action 
directing the President to exercise a discretionary constitutional power potentially 
violates the separation of powers doctrine.  
Where it concerns having regard to separation of powers considerations in 
reviewing the Public Protector’s remedial action, President (2018 ) is 
 
1  (2018) 2 SA 100 (GP). 
2   See Report 6 of 2016/2017. 
3   2000 (1) SA 1 (CC).  
4   See SARFU III (2000) at para 146. 
  
  PUBLIC PROTECTOR’S REMEDIAL ACTION 
 
Page | 366  
 
distinguishable from SARB v Public Protector (SARB (2017))5 and President of RSA v 
Public Protector (President (2020))6. In both SARB (2017) and President  (2020), the 
same High Court had regard to separation of powers concerns in reviewing the 
remedial action of the Public Protector. In SARB (2017), the Court set aside the 
remedial action requiring the amendment of a constitutional provision on the basis 
that it offends the separation of powers doctrine, which according to the Court is 
protected in terms of section 1(c) of the Constitution . Similarly, in President (2020), 
the High Court had regard to the separation of powers doctrine in setting aside the 
remedial action of the Public Protector directed at the Speaker of the National Assembly 
and the National Director of Public Prosecutions.  
This article considers, from a separation of powers perspective, the ambit of the 
Public Protector’s power to take appropriate remedial action directing other 
functionaries to exercise discretionary powers . It also considers the role of the courts in 
exercising their supervisory jurisdiction over the Public Protector so as to prevent the 
Public Protector from ordering remedial action that may be classified as overreach, and 
negatively impact the legitimacy of the office of the Public Protector. The specific focus 
is President  (2018) where there was no engagement with the separation of powers 
doctrine, but the earlier SARB (2017) decision and the more recent decision in President 
(2020) are also considered, as in those cases the relevance of the separation of powers 
doctrine in settling highly contentious political issues is evident. The purpose of this 
article is to consider the possible implications when proper regard is not had to the 
separation of powers doctrine, which is a fundamental tenet of South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy. 
As President (2018) dealt with the remedial action of the Public Protector directing 
the President to appoint a commission of inquiry in terms of section 84(2)(f) of the 
Constitution, it is necessary , first, to  discuss the understanding of the President’s 
power exercised in terms of section 84(2), and, secondly, to set out the specific purpose 
of a commission of inquiry. Thereafter, the decision in President (2018) is considered in 
the light of the facts, and the Court’s understanding of both section 84(2) of the 
Constitution and the power of the Public Protector to take remedial action. The 
implications of this judgment on the separation of powers doctrine and the reach of the 
Public Protector’s power to take appropriate remedial action are then considered. In its 
conclusion the article finds that neglecting to consider the separation of powers 
doctrine weakens the doctrine as an underlying principle directing the manner in which 
disputes between different branches of government are resolved. Furthermore, the 
decision demonstrates that the Public Protector wields the power to direct the 
executive arm of the State to exercise its discretionary constitutional powers if that will 
address the harm that the investigation of the Public Protector uncovered. This, 
however, exposes the office of the Public Protector to several risks, which may 
undermine the institution’s ability to adequately fulfil its mandate.  
 
5   2017 (6) SA 198 (GP). 
6   (2020) 5 BCLR 513 (GP). 
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2. THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO APPOINT A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
The South African President acts as both head of State and head of the national 
executive authority.7 Section 84(2) of the Constitution sets out the powers the President 
exercises as head of State,8 while section 85 of the Constitution sets out the powers the 
President exercises as head of the national executive authority.9 Although the President 
is part of the executive authority and therefore the exercise of his power is always 
regarded as the exercise of executive powers,10 there are significant differences 
between the manner in which the President exercises his constitutional powers as head 
of State in section 84(2) and the manner in which he exercises his constitutional powers 
as head of the executive in section 85. It may therefore be important to locate the 
exercise of presidential power either under section 84(2) or section 85. 
When exercising section 84(2) powers, the President usually acts alone.11 Section 
84(2) therefore does not require “collective action”12 on the part of the President. 
However, in exercising section 85 powers, the President exercises those powers 
“together with the other members of the Cabinet”.13 Therefore, in Minister for Justice 
and Constitutional Development v Chonco14 (Chonco (2010)) the Constitutional Court 
remarked that “[w]hat separates the exercise of powers and functions under section 84 
from those under section 85 is that the former are performed exclusively by the 
President, while the latter are performed collectively by the President and members of 
the Cabinet”.  
In SARFU III (2000) the Constitutional Court gave further content to the 
understanding of the President’s powers in section 84(2), particularly where it concerns 
the appointment of commissions of inquiry. In SARFU III (2000), the Constitutional 
Court, in deciding whether the President’s decision to appoint a commission of inquiry 
is administrative action reviewable under administrative justice and section 33 of the 
Constitution, distinguished between three categories of head of State powers in section 
84(2). The first are those found in sections 84(2)(a)-(c), which relate to the President’s 
“controlled constitutional responsibilities directly related to the legislative process”.15 
These relate to the signing of bills or referring them back to the legislature or 
 
7  See SARFU III (2000) at para 144. See also Murray C & Stacey R “The President and the National 
Executive” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2ed Cape Town: Juta 
(2013) at 18-1. 
8  See SARFU III (2000) at para 144. Section 84(2) of the Constitution includes the former prerogative 
powers usually exercised by the head of State, see President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 
(4) SA 1 (CC) (Hugo (1997)) at para 5. 
9  See Murray & Stacey  (2013) at 18-4. 
10  See Hugo (1997) at para 11. 
11  Murray & Stacey (2013) at 18-5 state that the “President need consult no one when exercising a power 
or performing a function” when exercising his powers as head of State.  
12  Murray & Stacey R (2013) at 18-4. 
13  Section 85(2) of the Constitution. See also Murray & Stacey (2013) at 18-1, 2, 4.  
14  2010 (4) SA 82 (CC) at para 37. 
15  See SARFU III (2000) at para 146. 
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alternatively to the Constitutional Court in appropriate circumstances. The second 
category includes those powers in section 84(2)(d)-(e), which are “narrow 
constitutional responsibilities … [related] to the execution of provisions of the 
Constitution”.16 For instance, section 84(2)(e) grants the President the power to make 
appointments as required by the Constitution. In this capacity, the President appoints 
the members of the various Chapter 9 institutions in terms of section 193 of the 
Constitution. In these cases the President merely formalises the appointment “on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly”. The third category includes those powers 
in sections 84(2)(f)-(k). The Constitution does not expressly place any constraint upon 
the exercise of these powers. Instead, the powers are considered to be “discretionary 
powers of the President”.17 They include, in section 84(2)(f), the power to appoint 
commissions of inquiry.18 
Although the Court’s ultimate finding was that none of these powers are 
administrative in nature and therefore not reviewable under administrative justice, 
the discussion above does indicate that section 84(2) creates constitutional powers 
that are vested in the President. The Court held that when the President appointed a 
commission of inquiry “he was exercising an original constitutional power vested in him 
alone”19. Although the President has the power to appoint a commission of inquiry in 
terms of section 84(2)(f), there are nevertheless several constraints on the exercise of 
that power as identified by the Court.20 First, the President must exercise the power 
personally; he cannot delegate the power of appointment to someone else. Secondly, the 
decision to appoint a commission of inquiry must be recorded in writing and signed by 
the President. Thirdly, the decision may not infringe on any right in the Bill of Rights. 
Fourthly the President must act in good faith. Lastly, the principle of legality (and 
rationality) applies to the exercise of the power.  
From SARFU III (2000) it is clear that the President alone has the power to appoint 
a commission of inquiry. Unlike the injunction to make the relevant appointments or 
complete the legislative process by signing a bill, the President cannot appoint a 
commission on the instruction of another person such as a minister or a constitutional 
body such as the National Assembly.  
The purpose of a commission of inquiry has also been considered by the judiciary. 
In Madigiwana v President of the Republic of South Africa (Madigiwana (2013)), the 
Constitutional Court stated that “[i]t is open to the President to search for the truth 
through a commission” 21. The purpose of a commission of inquiry is therefore to 
 
16  See SARFU III (2000) at para 146. 
17  See SARFU III (2000) para 145. 
18  It also includes in s 84(2)(j), the power to pardon offenders, of which the Court in Chonco (2010) at 
para 35 said the following: “The final decision on a pardon application, and the constitutional 
responsibility for that decision, rests with the President as Head of State. On that there is no contest.” 
19  See SARFU III (2000) at para 147. 
20  See SARFU III (2000) at para 148. 
21  (2013) 11 BCLR 1251 (CC) at para 15. 
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“determine facts and to advise the president through the making of 
recommendations”22. These recommendations may inform the President as to certain 
corrective measures that can be taken, it may influence a change in policy or lead to 
legislative reform.23 The President is, however, not bound to follow the 
recommendations made by a commission of inquiry.24 A commission of inquiry is 
therefore within the remit of the President. It is for the President to decide when it 
would be appropriate to appoint a commission for purposes of investigating certain 
matters in order to receive recommendations.25  
An important aspect of a commission of inquiry is also the “deeper public 
purpose”26 it serves. Although a commission of inquiry seeks to establish or uncover 
certain facts, it is also an important mechanism to realise the constitutional values of 
accountability and transparency.27 The rationale for a commission of inquiry as an 
appropriate mechanism to further uncover the allegations of State capture is not 
disputed. The Court in  President     (2018) was probably correct in its finding that the 
appointment of a commission of inquiry, as ordered through the remedial action, is 
rationally related to the purpose of uncovering the allegation made in the State of 
Capture Report.28 However, the question that is left unanswered is whether it is within 
the remit of the Public Protector to direct the President to exercise a discretionary 
constitutional power in a manner that does not have regard to the principle of 
separation of powers.  
3. PRESIDENT OF THE RSA V  PUBLIC PROTECTOR (2018) 
3.1. Introduction 
Against this background, the decision of President (2018) should be understood. In this 
decision, the President sought to set aside some components of the remedial action 
ordered by the Public Protector in terms of her State of Capture Report. The President 
in particular wanted to have the remedial action requiring him to appoint a commission 
of inquiry, that was to be headed by a judge recommended by the Chief Justice, set aside. 
One of the main objections of the President was that he alone can appoint a commission 
of inquiry as the Constitution vests that power in the President. He therefore argued 
that it is unconstitutional for the Public Protector to instruct him to appoint a 
commission of inquiry. The President also argued that if he were to comply with the 
 
22  See SARFU III (2000) at para 146. 
23  See Madigiwana (2013) at para 15. 
24 See SARFU III (2000) at para 146. Also confirmed more recently by the Constitutional Court in Minister 
of Police v Premier of the Western Cape 2014 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 44. It is, however, accepted that 
ignoring recommendations may in certain cases lead to political repercussions. 
25  See Madigiwana v President of the Republic of South Africa [2014] 1 All SA 76 (GNP) at para 27. 
26  Minister of Police v Premier of the Western Cape 2014 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 45. 
27  See Madigiwana (2013) at para 15.  
28  See President (2018) at para 140.  
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remedial action, his decision to appoint a commission of inquiry would be reviewable as 
he would have abdicated his decision-making powers granted to him by section 84.29  
Therefore, the main question was “whether the President’s constitutional power to 
appoint a commission of inquiry can permissibly be limited by remedial action taken by 
the Public Protector”.30 The limitations, or constraints, upon the President’s power to 
appoint a commission of inquiry had already been set out in SARFU III (2000), which 
was discussed above. The question that was not considered in this decision is, however, 
whether the remedial action of the Public Protector can take away a discretionary 
constitutional power of the President within a constitutional democracy that 
incorporates a separation of powers. In answering the main question, the Court had 
regard, first, to section 84(2) of the Constitution, and secondly, to the Public Protector’s 
power to take appropriate remedial action. In the following parts, these two aspects are 
considered in more detail, as these are the justifications relevant to this article on which 
the Court relied in upholding the remedial action.  
3.2. The Court’s understanding of section 84(2) of the Constitution 
In relation to the discussion of the President’s power under section 84(2) of the 
Constitution, the Court accepted that the power to appoint a commission of inquiry 
vests in the President alone. The Court also accepted that the power of appointment is 
an “original constitutional power”31 of the President. The Court then correctly indicated 
that the power to appoint a commission of inquiry is not free of any constraints. The 
Court had regard to the fact that in exercising his constitutional powers, the President 
may not infringe any right in the Bill of Rights, and that the exercise of the power is 
subject to the principle of legality. Therefore, the Court was initially relatively clear on 
the power of the President regarding the appointment of commissions of inquiry. The 
Court’s reasoning is also in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s remarks in 
SARFU III (2000)regarding the appointment of commissions of inquiry.  
However, the Court proceeded to consider the specific words used in sections 84(1) 
& (2), to find that the power of the President to appoint a commission of inquiry “is a 
power coupled with a duty”32. It is not immediately clear what the duty is to which the 
Court is referring. The High Court accepted that there are certain constraints on the 
exercise of the President’s power to appoint a commission of inquiry. However, the 
Court did not elaborate on what the duty it referred to may be. Instead it proceeded to 
refute the argument of the President based on the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
 
29  See President (2018) at para 59.1 with reference to SARFU III (2000) at paras 39-40. 
30  See President (2018) at  60. The inelegantly phrased question is regrettable. As made clear in SARFU III 
(2000), there are many limitations that apply to the exercise of the powers of the President. The 
question should arguably not have been whether the remedial action may limit the President’s powers, 
but rather whether the President can be forced by the remedial action ordered by the Public Protector 
to exercise a discretionary constitutional power.  
31  See President (2018) at para 61. 
32  See President (2018) at para 68. 
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Daniel v President of the Republic of South Africa (Daniel (2013)) .33 The President relied 
on a dictum in that case , where the Court held that “section 84(2)(f) does not impose a 
duty on the President but a power which may be exercised at his discretion”34.  
The High Court reasoned that reliance on Daniel (2013) was misplaced as it  dealt 
with the “question whether the Constitutional Court – as opposed to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal and the High Court – had jurisdiction in terms of s167(4)(e) of the 
Constitution”35. The Court in Daniel (2013) held that the refusal or failure to appoint a 
commission of inquiry is not a failure to fulfil a constitutional obligation and is therefore 
not justiciable under section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution. It is not easy to understand 
why reliance on Daniel (2013) was misplaced. Although the decision dealt with when a 
constitutional obligation on the part of the President would arise that would trigger the 
Constitutional Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, the Court did make it clear that the power 
to appoint a commission of inquiry is a discretionary power of the President. In refuting 
the argument of the President, the Court therefore did not explain what it meant when it 
stated that the President’s power to appoint a commission of inquiry is also coupled 
with a duty. 
In Chonco (2010) the Constitutional Court had regard to a duty of the President in 
relation to the power in section 84(2)(j), which concerns the pardoning of offenders. In 
Chonco, (2010) the Court held that when a request for pardon is submitted to the 
President, he would have a duty to consider that request “in good faith, in accordance 
with the principle of legality and without delay”36.  Based on the above, it would seem 
clear that the duty of the President in relation to the exercise of the power to appoint a 
commission of inquiry relates to the duty to exercise the power in compliance with the 
principle of legality and rationality, in good faith, and in a manner that does not violate 
any right in the Bill of Rights.  
However, it is unlikely that this is the duty to which the Court referred to in 
President  (2018), as the Court had already discussed these factors (or constraints) 
earlier in the judgment with reference to established jurisprudence. A possible 
explanation of the understanding of the duty to which the Court referred  is the 
President’s duty to appoint a commission of inquiry because he has been instructed to 
do so by the Public Protector in terms of remedial action that the Court considered to be 
appropriate and rational, and therefore, binding. As the President is the only person 
with the constitutional power to appoint a commission of inquiry, he would therefore 
 
33  (2013) 11 BCLR 1241 (CC). 
34  At para 12. 
35 President (2018) at para 70. Section 167(4) of the Constitution sets out the issues over which the 
Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Section 167(4)(e) specifically states that “[o]nly the 
Constitutional Court may decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional 
obligation”.  
36  See Chonco (2010) at para 30. 
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have a duty to appoint a commission if directed to do so by another institution that has 
the power to make binding orders.37 
Regrettably, the Court did not consider whether the exercise of a discretionary 
constitutional power may be usurped by another branch of government38 and whether 
there are any objections from a separation of powers perspective. The Court stated at 
the end of its discussion on the power of the President in terms of section 84(2) that 
“[t]he President’s power to appoint a commission of inquiry will necessarily be curtailed 
where his ability to conduct himself without constraints brings him into conflict with his 
obligations under the Constitution”39 .  However, the Court’s explanation of the 
President’s power to appoint a commission of inquiry in terms of section 84(2) of the 
Constitution as one coupled with a duty does not justify the usurpation of the 
President’s discretionary constitutional powers.  
3.2. The Court’s understanding of the Public Protector’s remedial action 
With regard to the lawfulness of the Public Protector’s remedial action, the President 
argued that it is unconstitutional for the Public Protector to instruct the President to 
appoint a commission of inquiry. Furthermore, the President argued that it was beyond 
the Public Protector’s power to “direct the manner in which the commission of inquiry 
is to be implemented”40 . 
The Court had regard to the Public Protector’s constitutional powers in section 182 
of the Constitution, and its legislative powers as set out in the Public Protector’s Act.41 In 
order to fulfil the mandate to protect the public from governmental action that may be 
harmful or prejudicial, the Public Protector can take appropriate remedial action. This 
remedial action must be situational;42 it must therefore be effective in “remedying the 
wrong in the particular circumstances ”43.  Therefore, the remedial action must be 
 
37  This would be similar to the duty the President has to sign a bill in terms of s 84(2)(a) in cases where 
the President does not refer the bill back to Parliament (s 84(2)(b)) or to the Constitutional Court (s 
84(2)(c)). 
38  The Public Protector, together with certain other Chapter 9 institutions, has been described as a 
“fourth branch of government”, Seedorf S & Sibanda S “Separation of Powers” in Woolman  & Bishop  
(eds)  (2013) at 12-30 to 12-32; Klug H “Transformative constitutionalism and the role of integrity 
institutions in tempering power: the case of resistance to state capture in post-apartheid South Africa” 
(2019) 67 Buffalo Law Review 701 at 709; Hodgson TF “The mysteriously appearing and disappearing 
doctrine of separation of powers: toward a distinctly South Africa doctrine for a more radically 
transformative Constitution” (2018) 34 SAJHR 57 at 75-76. 
39  See President (2018)at  para 71 (own emphasis). 
40  President (2018) at para 59.3. 
41  As contained in the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994. 
42  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker, National Assembly & others 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) (Economic 
Freedom Fighters (2016)) at para 71. 
43  President (2018) at para 82. 
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effective in the circumstances, and, unless set aside by a court, is binding on the 
parties.44  
In the present circumstances, the Court held that it is appropriate for the Public 
Protector to order the President to appoint a commission of inquiry.45 The Court found 
that the remedial action is appropriate in the circumstances, as the prima facie case of 
large-scale malfeasance and corruption requires a large-scale investigation, for which 
the Public Protector does not have sufficient resources. In this regard, the Court held 
that the remedial action directing the President to appoint a commission of inquiry is 
rationally related to the purpose of uncovering the scale of corruption in State affairs.46  
The findings of the Court in relation to the power of the Public Protector to take 
remedial action cannot easily be disputed on an individual level. There was sufficient 
prima facie evidence of corruption that had to be uncovered. It was also established that 
the Public Protector did not have the necessary resources to conduct and complete such 
an investigation. The remedial action was also rationally related to the purpose of 
uncovering the scale of corruption. Therefore, the remedial action is binding as there is, 
according to the Court, no basis on which to set it aside. As such, the Court must have 
deemed the remedial action to be lawful. 
However, taken as a whole, the Court’s refusal to set aside the remedial action of 
the Public Protector meant that a Chapter 9 institution directed (or forced) the 
President, in his capacity as head of State, to exercise a discretionary constitutional 
power that is not related to the legislative process or the execution of constitutional 
provisions. Up until this decision it was understood that the President must make the 
decision to appoint a commission of inquiry alone, and that he cannot act on the dictate 
of another person in exercising this discretionary power. The Court did not consider 
whether – within the separation of powers doctrine – any other branch can force the 
President to exercise this discretionary constitutional power for purposes of checks and 
balances. As such, the discussion of the power of the Public Protector to take 
appropriate remedial action, although in accordance with earlier case law, appears 
unconvincing from a broader separation of powers perspective.  
 
44 See Economic Freedom Fighters (2016). This was also recently confirmed in Economic Freedom Fighters 
v Gordhan; Public Protector v Gordhan [2020] ZACC 10 at para 100. However, Tsele M “‘Coercing virtue’ 
in the Constitutional Court: neutral principles, rationality and the Nkandla problem” (2018) CCR at 
193-220 questions the Court’s finding, where it was held that the remedial action of the Public 
Protector is binding unless set aside by a court. See Woolman S “ A politics of accountability : how 
South Africa’s judicial recognition of the binding legal effect of the Public Protector’s recommendations 
had a catalysing effect that brought down a president” (2018) CCR 155 , especially fn 135, for 
engagement with Tsele’s proposition.  
45  President (2018) at para 85. According to the Court : “ Any contrary interpretation would be 
inconsistent with the Constitution as aptly pronounced by the Constitutional Court in EFF, and would 
render the Public Protector’s power to take remedial action largely meaningless and ineffectual.” In 
Economic Freedom Fighters (2016) the Court stated that the remedial action will be meaningless if it is 
not binding on the parties. It did not make this point in relation to whether the remedial action is 
suitable in the circumstances, as that was not the case before the Constitutional Court.  
46  President (2018) at paras 130-140. 
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4. ANALYSIS FROM A SEPARATION OF POWERS PERSPECTIVE 
It has been argued that the separation of powers doctrine, as applied in South African 
law, is something of an enigma, that there is no conceptual clarity on what it means and 
how it is applied, and that it “seems to appear, disappear, reappear, and evolve at the 
Court’s convenience and whim”47. Although this argument is made in relation to the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, it may equally apply to the line of decisions of 
the particular High Court involving the remedial action of the Public Protector. In SARB 
(2017), an earlier decision of the same High Court, the remedial action of the Public 
Protector directing the National Assembly to amend section 224 of the Constitution in a 
manner dictated by her was set aside.48 In addition to the finding that the remedial 
action should be set aside because the Public Protector was not empowered by section 
182(1) of the Constitution to order such remedial action,49 the Court also considered the 
ground of review relating to separation of powers. The Court considered this point even 
though the Public Protector agreed that it was unlawful for her to order the amendment 
of section 224 of the Constitution. With regard to the remedial action relating to the 
amendment of section 224, the Court reasoned as follow:  
“The Public Protector’s orders trenches unconstitutionally and irrationally on 
Parliament’s exclusive authority. The enactment of national legislation is within 
the exclusive constitutional domain of Parliament. Sections 43 and 44 of the 
Constitution vest legislative authority in Parliament, including the power to 
amend the Constitution … The Public Protector does not have the power to 
prescribe to Parliament how to exercise its discretionary legislative powers.”50 
In this regard, the Court held that the remedial action ordered by the Public Protector 
violates the separation of powers principle, which “requires constitutionally established 
institutions to respect the confines of their own powers and not to intrude into the 
domain of others”51. The remedial action directing the amendment of a constitutional 
provision in the manner dictated, therefore violates the separation of powers principle, 
in that it encroaches upon Parliament’s discretionary legislative powers. 
 
47  See Hodgson (2018) at 59. See also Swart M & Coggin T “The road not taken: separation of powers, 
interim interdicts, rationality review and e-tolling in National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling” 
(2015) CCR 346 at 346. 
48  Section 224(1) of the Constitution sets out the primary purpose of the South African Reserve Bank, 
which is “to protect the value of the currency in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic 
growth in the Republic”.  The Public Protector proposed the insertion of words so that the economic 
growth referred to is explicitly linked to protecting the socio-economic wellbeing of South African 
citizens.  
49  The Court specifically relied on s 6(2)(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2002, 
which states that an administrative action can be reviewed if the administrator “was not authorised to 
do so by the empowering provision”, the empowering provision in this case being s 182(1) of the 
Constitution. 
50  At  para 43. 
51  At para 44. 
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Similarly, in President  (2020) the same High Court had regard to separation of powers 
concerns when reviewing the Public Protector’s remedial action. In this decision, the 
Court was requested to review and set aside the remedial action of the Public Protector, 
which directed the Speaker of the National Assembly to cause the exercise of the 
National Assembly’s power to hold the executive authority accountable. The High Court 
accepted that it is the “Speaker’s constitutional role to determine what measures are 
most appropriate to deal with conduct that is alleged to breach the Rules or Codes 
applicable to the National Assembly”52. This finding rests on separation of powers 
considerations. Furthermore, the Court held that the Public Protector does not have the 
power to direct the National Director of Public Prosecutions to conduct further 
investigations and oversee the manner of implementation of that investigation. That 
interference will undermine prosecutorial independence,53 which is guaranteed in 
section 179(2) of the Constitution. 
However, in President (2018)the High Court did not consider the separation of 
powers doctrine in upholding the Public Protector’s remedial action against the 
President. Although the President argued that the remedial action ordering him to 
appoint a commission of inquiry offends the separation of powers doctrine, the Court 
did not consider the implications of the remedial action, and its upholding , on this 
doctrine. This line of case law therefore shows how the separation of powers doctrine 
appears, disappears, and reappears. The implications of such an approach is considered 
below.  
The purpose of the separation of powers is to avoid the concentration of public 
power in one institution so as to avoid the “abuse of power for personal gain”54. The 
separation of powers doctrine therefore recognises the division of governmental power 
and functions, as well as appropriate checks and balances to ensure that branches can 
be held accountable for the manner in which public power is exercised. Although not 
explicitly protected in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court accepts that the 
separation of powers doctrine is protected just as the other principles expressly 
mentioned in the Constitution are protected, and that any violation of the principle is in 
conflict with the Constitution and therefore invalid.55  
With regard to the separation of powers and the general principles of this doctrine 
as applied in South African law, Seedorf and Sibanda explain that although it is accepted 
that the powers and functions of the different branches of the State are interrelated, the 
Constitutional Court recognises the importance of “understanding the nature of each 
 
52  President (2020) at para 169. 
53  President (2020) at para 182. 
54  Seedorf & Sibanda (2013) at 12-1. See also Kohn L “The test for ‘exceptional circumstances’ where an 
order of substitution is sought: an analysis of Trencon against the backdrop of the separation of 
powers” (2018) CCR 91 at 93. 
55 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) (Heath (2001)) at 
paras 18-22.  
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branch’s separate (or pre-eminent) domain”56. Just as it is important to recognise the 
principle of checks and balances within the separation of powers doctrine, it is 
important to recognise that the separation of powers doctrine also protects “the 
unobstructed exercise of powers and functions”57 of the legislature, executive and 
judiciary, respectively. In this regard, Seedorf and Sibanda note that “the principle of 
pre-eminent domain protects the core functions and powers of each branch of 
government against intrusions from outside”58 . 
Certain powers or functions may therefore fall within the exclusive domain of a 
particular branch of government, and any interference with those exclusive powers or 
functions must be regarded as unconstitutional intrusions, and cannot be justified as 
necessary for effective checks and balances.59 Therefore, when it is alleged that there 
has been a breach of the separation of powers doctrine in that one branch exercises (or 
contemplates exercising) a power or function of a different branch, it must first be 
determined whether the particular power or function falls within the pre-eminent 
domain of one of the branches. Only if it does not can it be questioned whether the 
“particular power may be subject to limitations aimed at tempering its exercise and 
constraining its abuse”60 .  Accordingly, the principle of pre-eminent domain 
“emphasises the separation of functions and limits the attribution of certain powers to 
the ‘wrong’ institution”61. 
This theory may explain the outcome in SARB (2017).  It is within Parliament’s pre-
eminent domain to consider amendments to the Constitution and to follow the requisite 
procedures to effect such an amendment. Any other branch, even the fourth branch of 
the government, is not competent to intrude into the pre-eminent domain of a different 
branch.62 It can also explain the outcome in President (2020) where the High Court set 
aside the remedial action directed at the Speaker and the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions as the remedial action encroached upon power entrusted to these 
functionaries.  
However, in President (2018), the High Court did not consider the separation of 
powers and the principle of pre-eminent domain in upholding the Public Protector’s 
remedial action against the President. The Court did not consider whether the 
appointment of a commission of inquiry falls within the exclusive competency (or pre-
 
56 Seedorf & Sibanda (2013) at 12-39. See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 
721 (CC) at para 98 and cases cited there. See also Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister 
for Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC) (Director of the Public Prosecutions, 
Transvaal (2009)) at para 181. 
57 Seedorf & Sibanda (2013) at 12-39. 
58 Seedorf & Sibanda (2013) at 12-39. 
59 Seedorf & Sibanda (2013) at 12-39. 
60 Seedorf & Sibanda (2013) at 12-39. 
61 Seedorf & Sibanda (2013) at 12-40.  
62  It is also for this reason that the Public Protector may not investigate court decisions (s 183(2) of the 
Constitution), as the judicial authority is vested in the courts per s 165(1) of the Constitution.  
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eminent domain) of the President as head of State, and consequently under which 
circumstances, if at all, it may be justifiable to encroach upon that power for purposes of 
checks and balances. The decision therefore lacks an explanation of how, within the 
specific context, the separation of powers impacts the specific dispute before the Court 
or, conversely, how the outcome impacts the evolving understanding of the separation 
of powers doctrine.  
Intrusion into the domain of another branch (once decided that it does not fall in 
the pre-eminent domain of the branch) may be necessary in appropriate circumstances 
to ensure checks and balances.63 However, such an intrusion must be explained and 
justified.64 The omission of any such explanation is contrary to the manner in which the 
same Court and the Constitutional Court have dealt with disputes that touch upon 
sensitive separation of powers concerns. For instance, in S v Dodo (Dodo ,65 the 
Constitutional Court had to decide whether the finding of the High Court to the effect 
that legislation that obliges courts to impose a particular minimum sentence in defined 
cases unless there are “substantial and compelling circumstances”66 to find otherwise is 
unconstitutional in that it violates the separation of powers doctrine, should be 
confirmed. The argument of the High Court was that the imposition of minimum 
sentences occasions an intrusion by the legislature on the powers and functions of the 
judiciary and violates the separation of powers doctrine.67 The Constitutional Court 
gave a detailed exposition of the separation of powers doctrine, its origins and purpose, 
and how it is specifically to be understood in the South African context. The Court 
considered the specific context in setting out how the separation of powers doctrine, as 
defined, impacted on its ultimate decision.  
 
63  In Heath (2001) at para 4 the Court stated that corruption and maladministration go against the 
constitutional aspirations, but rooting it out must take place in a manner that is reconcilable with the 
dictates of the Constitution. Similarly, the alleged corruption laid bare in the State of Capture Report 
has to be addressed. However, the method that is to be employed must be reconciled with the dictates 
of the Constitution, which includes the separation of powers doctrine.  
64  For instance, while having regard to the autonomy of Parliament’s law-making process and the 
separation of powers doctrine, which prevents (in general) the court from interfering in parliamentary 
proceedings, the Constitutional Court acknowledged in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the 
National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) (Doctors for Life (2006)) at paras 37-38, that interference in 
the domain of another branch may be justifiable if mandated by the supreme Constitution. However, in 
President (2018), the Court did not offer any explanation of why the supreme Constitution mandates an 
intrusion, apart from accepting that the remedial action is binding and appropriate in the 
circumstances.  
65  S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC). 
66  Section 51(3)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.  
67  In S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 301 (E) at 322 the High Court, with reference to De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) 
SA 785 (CC) at para 61, stated that “whatever the boundaries of separation of powers are eventually 
determined to be, the imposition of the most severe penalty open to the High Court must fall within the 
exclusive prerogative and discretion of that Court. It falls within the heartland of the judicial power, 
and is not to be usurped by the Legislature.” 
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The Court, for instance, discussed the interest that the legislature and executive have in 
the imposition of sentences, to find that the separation of powers does not afford the 
judiciary the “sole authority to determine the nature and severity of sentences”68. The 
Court therefore had regard to the relationship between the branches with regard to the 
specific issue before it to justify why in this particular case there was no violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine. Such an explanation arguably provides for a richer 
understanding of the separation of powers doctrine and its application, also in future 
cases.69  
The separation of powers doctrine was effectively overlooked by the Court in 
President (2018) .  The Public Protector directed the President to appoint a commission 
of inquiry in the manner and form as prescribed by her. The Court affirmed the 
remedial action without justifying why it is permissible for the Public Protector to 
interfere with the exclusive power conferred on another branch by the Constitution 
itself. The fact that the remedial action is binding, rational, and appropriate in the 
circumstances was unfortunately not sufficient to dismiss the President’s arguments, 
which rested on separation of powers considerations. At the very least, the Court should 
have explained clearly why in this particular case, the concept that each branch is 
assigned separate powers and that interference with that separation may be 
unconstitutional, was not applicable in this case. There may be justifications for the 
intrusion,70 and those justifications – if presented – could have been debated. But, 
unfortunately, no justification other than finding the remedial action is rational or 
appropriate, was offered by the Court.  
It is accepted that the purpose of the separation of powers doctrine, together with 
the rule of law and the principle of democracy, is to ensure a society based on human 
rights,71 and that the allegation of corruption as noted in the State of Capture Report 
 
68  S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at para 33.1. 
69  In other cases, the Constitutional Court also considered the separation of powers doctrine, specifically 
the boundaries created by the doctrine that prevent branches from intruding into the domain of other 
branches. In Doctors for Life (2006), the Court considered whether it is appropriate to intervene in the 
parliamentary law-making process. The Court, at para 37, recognised that the legislature has autonomy 
over the law-making process, and that in determining whether and when it would be justifiable to 
intervene in that process, the Court “must observe the constitutional limits of … [its] authority” .  
Similarly, in Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal (2009) at paras 178-185, the Court emphasised 
the importance of the separation of powers doctrine. It noted that although the judiciary has the power 
to review the exercise of powers of the legislature and the executive, it cannot usurp those powers and 
exercise them themselves. The Court therefore, at para 183, stated that the judiciary has “a duty to 
patrol the constitutional borders defined by the Constitution. … [It] cannot, therefore, cross those 
borders”.  
70  See Doctors for Life (2006) at para 37, where the Constitutional Court accepted that intrusion in the 
domain of another branch is possible if the Constitution, as supreme law, makes provision for such 
intrusion. See also Hodgson (2018) at 76-77, who argues that in the broader constitutional mandate to 
address inequality and poverty, the courts may at times find that a particular intrusion into another 
branch’s territory is unconstitutional, while at a different time find that such an intrusion is acceptable. 
71  Seedorf & Sibanda (2013) at 12-1. 
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weakens the State’s ability to effectively realise the advancement of human rights. 
Corruption and maladministration must be eradicated, and those found guilty must be 
held accountable. However, there are various ways in which that can be done, and it is 
prudent to navigate between the available means in a manner that does not strain the 
delicate balance between the various constitutional values and principles at play. 
Ensuring that those who exercise public power are held accountable, must be done in a 
manner respectful of all constitutional values and principles and not in a manner where 
certain principles, like the separation of powers, are not regarded appropriately.72 The 
fact that the separation of powers was not considered in any detail, led to certain 
unforeseen and undesirable consequences, which are considered below.  
5. THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENT OF THE RSA V PUBLIC 
PROTECTOR (2018) 
As the Court did not concern itself with separation of powers considerations, 
particularly whether it is justifiable for the Public Protector to direct the President to 
exercise his discretionary constitutional power, there is now uncertainty as to the 
understanding of the President’s head of State powers, and the distinctions between the 
different powers as previously set out in SARFU III (2000).  In SARFU III (2000), as 
explained above, the Court distinguished between three categories of powers under 
section 84(2) of the Constitution. The second category is the responsibility of the 
President to make certain appointments in terms of the Constitution, which the Court 
regarded as part of the President’s “narrow constitutional responsibilities”73. When 
these appointments are made, the President merely formalises the decision of the 
National Assembly. In SARFU III (2000) the appointment of commissions of inquiry was 
regarded as part of the third category of powers the President exercises as head of State, 
which includes discretionary powers that are not constrained by any other 
constitutional provision.74  
The implication of President (2018)  is that the discretionary power of the President 
to appoint a commission of inquiry – as was explained in SARFU III (2000) - is allegedly 
now constrained by the remedial action that a Public Protector may order in terms of 
section 182 of the Constitution. Because the remedial action is binding, the President is 
duty-bound to exercise his once discretionary constitutional power when required to do 
so by the Public Protector. It is also now appropriate for the appointment of the 
particular person to head the commission to be selected by a different person. The court 
will seemingly not interfere with the Public Protector’s decision to make such a 
 
72  Such an approach is also out of sync with the sentiment expressed by Ngcobo J in Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Transvaal (2009) at para 181, where he stated : “The importance of the principle of the 
separation of powers in our constitutional democracy cannot be gainsaid. It is required by the very 
structure of our Constitution.” If the available accountability mechanisms in terms of the Constitution 
are not suitable, or appear to be inconsequential, then questions must be asked about the mechanisms 
and whether amendments to those mechanisms are necessary. 
73 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal (2009) at para 145. 
74 See SARFU III (2000) at para 146. 
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direction when the remedial action is rationally linked to the stated purpose. This places 
the power to appoint a commission of inquiry into the second category as discussed 
above, as it would be similar to the President making the various appointments on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly, but in this case, on the (binding) 
recommendation of the Public Protector. This essentially strips the President of any 
discretion in deciding whether to appoint a commission of inquiry, and is not 
reconcilable with the Constitutional Court’s decision in SARFU III (2000). 
If the court accepts that the power of the President to appoint a commission of 
inquiry can be so constrained, will it be possible in future to direct the President to 
pardon offenders in terms of section 84(2)(j), a power of the President as head of State 
that also falls within the third category as identified by SARFU III (2000)? These are 
further question that arises due to the fact that the Court did not consider whether in 
fact the Public Protector has the power, from a separation of powers perspective, to 
direct the President to exercise a discretionary constitutional power.  
More broadly, it appears that the particular High Court has now accepted that it is 
within the Public Protector’s power to direct the other branches to exercise a 
discretionary constitutional power. The idea that the Public Protector can direct the 
President to exercise a discretionary constitutional power in appropriate circumstances 
was again noted in President (2020) .  In that decision, the Court – with reference to 
President (2018) – stated that “[t]he Public Protector has the power to direct or instruct 
members of the Executive, to exercise powers entrusted to them under the Constitution 
where it is required to remedy the harm in question”75. The Court mentioned that the 
Public Protector, as an organ of State, must abide by the separation of powers doctrine 
in ordering the remedial action, but this statement seems to be aimed at showing 
appropriate “deference to the expertise within the other organs of state”76.  It does not 
refer to having regard to the principle that the Constitution vests different powers in 
different branches and that generally, those powers cannot be exercised by another 
branch. This has grave implications for the devolution of power generally, and the 
potential reach of the Public Protector’s power more broadly. 
It has been argued that the potentials for overreach on the part of the Public 
Protector “can be, and already have been, cabined by effective judicial oversight”77. 
However, President (2018) shows that sometimes judicial oversight is not effective in 
cabining the reach of the Public Protector’s power. Since the Public Protector’s remedial 
action may be binding, a finding that the remedial action is appropriate and rational in 
the circumstances is not alone sufficient to uphold the remedial action in cases where 
the remedial action purportedly directs other branches to exercise a discretionary 
constitutional power. In those circumstances, courts must also seriously consider 
 
75 President (2020) at para 164. The statement of the Court is wide enough to include both mandatory 
(like those powers of the President relating to the completion of the legislative process) and 
discretionary powers.  
76 President (2020) at para 164. 
77 See Woolman (2018) at 159. 
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whether, within the separation of powers doctrine and the principle of pre-eminent 
domain, the remedial action is constitutionally acceptable. Such a contextual exposition 
would also assist in determining with greater clarity the outer limits of the Public 
Protector’s power. 
In the light of Economic Freedom Fighters (2016), where the Constitutional Court 
held that remedial action ordered by the Public Protector is binding and must be given 
effect to unless set aside by a court, and President  (2018), where the intrusive remedial 
action was upheld, the Public Protector may have been emboldened to take the 
remedial action that has now been the subject of great controversy. This includes the 
remedial action ordering the amendment of the Constitution (SARB (2017)), and the 
overbroad (and unlawful) remedial action relating to the investigation of the CR17 
campaign (President (2020), which was set aside by the relevant court. On the strength 
of several adverse findings against the Public Protector, including the decision in SARB 
(2017)and the subsequent decision of the Constitutional Court in Public Protector v 
South African Reserve Bank 78, where the Court upheld the personal cost order in favour 
of the Reserve Bank against the Public Protector, the fitness of Advocate Mkhwebane to 
hold the office of Public Protector was challenged in Institute for Accountability in 
Southern Africa v Public Protector 79. Although the challenge was unsuccessful, it does 
impact negatively on the integrity of the office of the Public Protector.80 Not cabining the 
remedial action of the Public Protector, which may have led to the over-zealous issuing 
of remedial action, may therefore negatively impact the integrity of the office of the 
Public Protector, which has proven to be a vital institution in strengthening South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In President (2018), the Court upheld the remedial action of the Public Protector 
directing the President to appoint a commission of inquiry headed by a judge selected 
by the Chief Justice. In upholding the decision the Court argued that the President has a 
duty to appoint a commission of inquiry as there was no basis upon which to set the 
binding remedial action of the Public Protector aside. The Court upheld the remedial 
action without having regard to the President’s argument that the remedial action in 
fact violates the separation of powers doctrine. The Court, in not having regard to the 
separation of powers doctrine, departed from its own decision in SARB (2017) and 
decisions of the Constitutional Court, where the separation of powers doctrine was 
considered in a contextual manner whenever arguments were made regarding the 
intrusion of one branch into the domain of another. The decision of the High Court in 
President (2018) shows that the separation of powers doctrine is invoked as an ad hoc 
 
78  (2019) 6 SA 253 (CC). 
79  [2020] ZAGPPHC 64 (24 March 2020). 
80  This may have necessitated  the Court in Economic Freedom Fighters v Gordhan; Public Protector v 
Gordhan [2020] ZACC 10 (29 May 2020) at para 99 to emphasise that although the Public Protector 
may rightly be criticised, the Office of the Public Protector must at all times be respected.  
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principle, even though the Constitutional Court has accepted the central role of this 
doctrine in South African law.  
The implication of the judgment in President (2018) is that the Public Protector can 
seemingly now direct the President to exercise his discretionary powers through taking 
remedial action, even in cases where the Constitutional Court has regarded the 
particular power as set out in the constitutional text to be in the sole discretion of the 
President.81 The judgment also shows that a court will in certain cases not interfere 
with remedial action if that remedial action is rational, lawful and addresses the harm in 
question, irrespective of separation of powers concerns. The effect of this judgment is 
that it places the office of the Public Protector in a powerful position, a position that was 
not necessarily contemplated, and one which may, as shown in President (2020), 
negatively affect the integrity and legitimacy of the office of the Public Protector, and 
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